U.S. and Russian diplomats are set to begin negotiations in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday.

EU retter blikket mot Norge og norsk forsvarsindustri i sin nye forsvarsplan. – Vi ønsker et sterkt partnerskap med Norge, framholdt en høytstående tjenesteperson da EU-kommisjonens forsvarsplan ble presentert i Brussel onsdag. I planen blir det understreket at EU «vil fordype forholdet når det gjelder felles anskaffelser og flaggskip-prosjekter med Norge». «Readiness 2030» er navnet EU-kommisjonen har gitt den nye planen, som er et såkalt «white paper», noe tilsvarende en stortingsmelding, om Europas forsvar. I mai i fjor undertegnet Norge en ny avtale om forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid med EU. (NTB)

Check against delivery! Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to do this College readout for the first time. This morning, we adopted several files related to the White Paper on the future of European Defence and Rearm Europe Plan ‘Readiness 2030’, including two pieces of legislation to strengthen the European defence industry while proposing the necessary flexibilities in expenditures. We will delve into the details of these proposals shortly and I will be happy to answer your questions together with Commissioner [for Defence Industry and Space, Andrius] Kubilius. In addition, the College also adopted a Comprehensive plan for Savings and Investments Union. Commissioner [for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union, Maria Luis] Albuquerque will provide a detailed presentation on this plan immediately after this press conference. Later today, Executive Vice-President Séjourné will host the third press conference here in the press room to outline the Steel and Metals Plan which was also adopted this morning. We can now turn to the White Paper on the future of European defence and ReArm Europe Plan ‘Readiness 2030’. When it comes to defence - what we invest in defence - actually shows how we value defence and for the past decade we have not put the[a] very high importance on it. The international order is undergoing changes of the magnitude not seen since 1945. This is a pivotal moment for European security. It is a pivotal moment for action. Yes, that the needs of additional funding are massive. The proposals we have adopted today are also essential. But for all the important discussions needed on increasing defence spending, the value we add by working together is priceless. It gives us [a] competitive advantage that is unrivalled anywhere in the world. Together we are always stronger. The White Paper on Defence Readiness 2030 is our proposal for how we can work together and the ReArm package brings the financing possibilities to do it. Three points. First: making European countries stronger against any military threat. We have identified the capability gaps that Member States have and, in line with the NATO capability priorities, we put forward ideas how to work together to in order to fulfil them. This means replenishing European stocks of ammunition, weapons, military equipment, also to keep them flowing to Ukraine, and developing also a large scale pan European projects. The EU has important added value. We can support Member States to aggregate demand and harmonise requirements. We can support European industry, ramp up production capacity, and we can also support Member States where they cannot do it alone because it is either too expensive or too complex. It is faster and cheaper if you work together and interoperability, - which is also a problem for us that the capabilities do not really work together - can be built from the start. Ukraine should be part of this work too. We have a lot to learn from Ukraine’s battlefield experience. We should also be in a position to develop defence systems for Ukraine, but also with Ukraine. Member States must remain in the driving seat when it comes to defence. This is a question of national sovereignty and that is why we must connect our work here in Brussels with the end users, that it means our Member States. We do this through the European Defence Agency, through the EU Military Staff here in Brussels, and by bringing the EU Defence Ministers together regularly. We also have once in a generation opportunity to strengthen Europe's industry, boost innovation and create a market for defence equipment. And Commissioner Kubilius will talk about this in more detail. Second, what we are talking about today is more than our security and defence. While some look to destabilise others, a stronger EU can keep working to support others because we have never seen the world as a zero-sum game. We know that wherever you are in the world, peace brings prosperity and stability, from the Middle East, including the stabilisation of Syria - which we discussed Monday at the Syria Conference - to the wider African continent from [the] Sahel, to Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. And we will keep working with others who share this view from the UK - where I was yesterday - to Australia, Canada and Japan. This is also why our partners should be part of our cooperative defence projects and initiatives too, where it makes sense for everybody's interests. And finally, Ukraine. In the White Paper we take up the proposals from the Military support initiative proposing a support to Ukraine, including more ammunition - at least 2 million rounds per year - as well as air defence and drones, the training and equipping of Ukrainian brigades. This also includes direct support to Ukraine's defence industry as well as enhanced access to space services. The new SAFE instrument proposed by the Commission will support these ambitions. Russia’s economy is in full war mode: 40% of the federal budget on the military is more than Russia spends on education, healthcare and social policies combined. Regardless of the ongoing negotiations for peace in Ukraine, this is a long-term investment in a long-term plan of aggression. Ukraine must be armed to avoid any future attacks, and we need a long-term plan to stand up to do this. To conclude, today we put forward a plan to tackle the immediate threat centre and the build-up European long-term defence. In doing so, we will help European countries meet their NATO capability targets we do this not to fight the war but to prepare for the worst, defend peace in Europe and stand strong for a world where might cannot make right. Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-268889 Q&A Q. I have two questions. The first one is to the Defence Commissioner. When this discussion started a while ago there, it started with a proposal by two Member States for a flagship project, which was basically a common air-defence shield. Now reading the White Paper, I realise that you identify gaps but there are absolutely no flagship projects in it. So my question is: why did you not pursue this path and deliver on this request? The second question go to the HR/VP, so we learned today take the cut-off date is 2021 when combined average spending by EU Member States was at 1.5%; adding 1.5% brings to 3%. Does this mean that this is the new level of ambition that should be pursued by Member States? Of course it's different for anyone at the new average level of vision . Thank you. So, it is clear that we are in a totally new era. A new international order is being shaped and, if you look back in the Cold War era, then all the countries in NATO were spending more than 2%, some even more than 5% of their GDP on defence. And why? Because the threat was real. Now we do not have a Cold War, but we have a hot war on European soil and the threat is existential – as real as it can get. So, yes, we need to do more. Whether the new level of ambition is a 3%, 4% or 5%, I would not get stuck to the numbers but rather the capability caps that we have and we have also addressed them in the White Paper. That is air and missile defence, artillery systems, ammunition, missiles, drones, counter drone systems, military mobility, AI, quantum electronic warfare, [and] strategic enablers. So, this all costs a lot of money. The point of the White Paper is that we can do them together because it is not only national defence, but actually regional, and by doing them together we can also spend less on the capabilities but have them in place. So, I would not get stuck to the numbers, but yes, I agree that the new level ambition is higher than 2% Q. Yesterday, the President of the Commission suggested that the Commission itself could act as a buyer of equipment for the Member States. You have not mentioned that. Is it a possibility that you are seriously looking at or is it just a suggestion that she made to be discussed further development in the future? We have the European Defence Agency that is underused I would say. So, we definitely do not need to create any new competences or any new structures if we have already structures in place. The competence on defence spending is of course with the Member States. It is only when they want to act together, then the European Defence Agency can bring something you know [of] additional value also to the table to make it easier and make it cheaper to find all those ways. Q. The proposal as written excludes third countries other than Norway and Ukraine, so notably the US, UK, Turkey. The UK exclusion, in particular, will be a really big problem for many Italians, Swedish, German companies, in particular. So, my first question is do the two of you agree with excluding those countries? And was there any debate inside the College about this French ‘buy European push’? And secondly, you are talking about urgent, you are talking about urgent scaling up, are you worried that this proposal will be derailed by the exact same fighting between Member States that has held up EDIP for more than a year edit on the same third country issue? Yes, I will add to that. First, I think we have this opportunity window to really build up the European defence industry and we are in this situation - what we see also with Ukraine if they use weapons that are not produced in Ukraine and sometimes there are limitations on how you can use those weapons, and, in terms of crisis, your military needs to really have free hands in this regard. So, that is coming from this situation. Like, [Commissioner] Andrius [Kubilius] was already explaining all the countries that are within the same categories and, when it comes to the UK, for example, then we are working on having this Defence and Security partnership with [the] UK. I am really hoping that for the Summit, which is in May, we can have results. But of course, like you know, it is related to Member States and also different worries. But I want to say that I think the understanding that we need to do more, and we need to do together is there, which means that we have been able to keep our unity so far. I am sure that we are [will be] able to keep our unity in the future because this is really our strength. Q. I have a question regarding funding. Why is the Commission only asking for financial predictability in the next MFF instead of talking about concrete future programmes? Are the new Eurobonds as asked by Portugal and Spain, for instance, for the defence completely out of the question? What is the Commission expectation on the countries’ feedback regarding SAFE and ReArm general? I will add to that. First, I mean MFF discussions are coming up. That is why these discussions are separate and if we put something very concrete right now forward then everybody wants their projects in. That is the problem that we had right now, although we have our priorities. Then, your question about how are the Member States taking it. First, we had two weeks ago the extraordinary Council and Member States were very positive about the ReArm part of this paper and tomorrow we will definitely discuss, and we will know more with [from] the Member States. But what can I tell you is that we have been working intensively with Member States to have their ideas on board and also their worries reflected. So, I hope that they take also well. Q. If you could please elaborate on what role investors - institutional and retail investors - are supposed to play in the funding of the rearmament initiative and whether there will be any changes particularly in the Sustainable Finance Framework in order to encourage investors to invest in the military build-up. If I may add to that, the point is that we have to really have the public capital as well as private capital. That is why we have, in the White Paper, also removal of obstacles related to access to finance and, actually, it is related to other point we discussed also in the College today about the Savings and Capital markets. The obstacles of finance are related to different aspects but in detail we are coming [to] in the defence omnibus - with all the regulated regulatory improvements that we need to do, but of course like [Commissioner] Andrius [Kubilius] was saying there is already a movement going and the European Investment Bank plays a huge role in this. Q. Do you think that the strategic thinking of Member States is the same? Are they perceiving the threat in the same way? Because if I look at some countries, for example the one that I know best, they do not fear a war with Russia. They fear much more migrants, for example, or other ‘threats’, if you would use that word. The second point, which is correlated: is Europe able to defend itself if the leader of the free world will not be anymore the US under this administration? Is this strategic thinking the same everywhere? I am not sure. I think no, because we have different countries. But if we talk to each other then, in the European Union, every leader understands the threat. Now the question is also to talk about this threat to the public, because the public perception - like you say - is different in the countries that are much further away from the war. But I urge you to look at the map and see how small Europe really is in this regard. Everything can happen very fast. And, in addition to that, we already see the hybrid attacks or, like [NATO] Secretary General Rutte says, state sponsored terrorism is happening everywhere, all across Europe. I think you know, We need to talk to the public everywhere in Europe to really explain this because the problem with defence expenditure and investment is that when you need it, it is too late. You have to make the decisions when it is peace time when actually you do not have feeling ‘we do not really need this’. We need to invest more. But if we do not invest in defence now, then in three-five years' time we have nowhere to take this from and then it is too late. I do not want to find ourselves in a situation where we think: “Oh, we should have made that decision then.” because we do not have the option to redo things. And the conflicts with investing in defence is that, when you do it, when you do enough of defence investments, then it actually deters, so that you do not have a war. So, if you want to prevent the war, we need to invest more in defence and we need to do it now when it is peace time. Thank you. Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-269484

Avtalen mellom India og EU skaper et frihandelsmarked for to milliarder mennesker og omfatter en firedel av verdensøkonomien.