The report, “Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Boko Haram,” was released by CNA Corp., a Washington-area think tank, on Tuesday. It was requested by U.S. Naval Forces Africa as it developed a supporting plan to U.S. Africa Command’s regional vision for the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa, CNA officials said.
Det der er vel fort hardware tilhørende Eeben Barlow og det som tidligere var kjent som Executive Outcomes. Dem er tungt inne på bakken i Nigeria med tyngre våpenplattformer og en liten kjerne med (hvite) rådgivere for å trene- og mentorere den dysfunksjonelle nigerianske hæren. Dem har gjort voldsomme framskritt med røyke ut og kverke Boko Haram i løpet av den korte tiden dem har vært i landet.
Mer eller mindre samme deal som i Sierra Leone tilbake på 90-tallet det der; Verdenssamfunnet gjorde fuckall for å stoppe myrderiet som foregikk der, annet enn å diskutere, vise handlekraft i form av skriftlige bekymringsmeldinger, fordømme og dobbelt fordømme situasjonen. Executive Outcomes fikk etter hvert tilslag til å få orden på stedet (fordi ingen andre ville ta hånd om situasjonen), mer eller mindre slik dem nå har gjort i Nigeria også, og fikk i løpet av kort tid kontroll på stedet. Det som skjedde videre etterpå er en annen historie.
Ingen skal komme her og fortelle meg at PMCs udelt er en uting her i verden...
Kopierte inn to siste innlegg fra nyhetstråden hit. #bokoharam
Skille
Interessant ref Executive Outcome og Eeben Barlow, MMB. Selveste Business Insider hadde akkurat denne artikkelen om fyren:
Nigeria hired South African mercenaries to wage a secret war on Africa's deadliest jihadist group
Mercenaries from South Africa have proved quietly decisive in helping the Nigerian military turn around its campaign against Boko Haram, writes Colin Freeman in Abuja
However, Col Barlow, whose firm has a code of conduct for behaving "in a legal, moral, and ethical manner" said that private companies were often better than UN or Western trainers of African armies. The latter were often hamstrung by political baggage and a failure to understand how either African armies or their enemies worked, he said. The advisers that Britain and America have sent to Nigeria are also not permitted to take part in operations on the ground, partly because of the Nigerian's army's poor human rights record.
Bilde fra artikkel med selskapet som du nevner, da de het Executive Outcomes "helicopter assault force in Sierra Leone".
South African Contractors Take the Fight to Boko Haram
While the world remains fixated on the “ISIS crisis” in the Middle East, a small group of South African soldiers-for-hire are once again proving what it takes to fight, and win, against terrorists and insurgents. Teamed up with Nigerian military forces, a private military company named Pilgrims Africa Ltd. is employing South African Special Forces veterans to do what they do best: fight the dirty little bush wars that the United Nations can’t or won’t fight themselves.
Military Hardware:
Obtaining military equipment is not an obstacle for EO. In the past, South African forces had little difficulty in acquiring weapons, especially through European intermediaries, because of worldwide arms overproduction. To avoid expensive weapons procurement costs, EO purchases advanced yet rugged equipment that is easily maintainable.
And, what should U.S. policy be toward transnational security corporations (a.k.a. mercenaries) such as the highly successful Executive Outcomes composed of former South African soldiers? Clearly, if power continues to accrue to transnational corporations, the United States will have to re-think some of the basic tenets of its approach to security and world politics.
SADF ‘mercenaries’ turning tide in NigeriaJohannesburg - Eeben Barlow, who headed the Executive Outcomes private security firm, has been named as the person behind a secretive former South African Defence Force (SADF) contingent that is helping Nigeria to combat Boko Haram.
Fatn denne boken på Amazon om EO. Ikke lest den selv, men antar ganske så interessant. Ser Barlow skriver på en bok som jeg antar blir interessant lesning for mange. Sitat hentet fra bloggen hans: "My book is now completed in terms of writing, editing and now I am awaiting the final artwork before it goes off to be sorted for publication. The book carries the sub-title “Towards an African Art of War”. Han driver også en blogg i tillegg til bokskriving og fagartikler, så dette er en fyr med stor skrivekløe åpenbart basert på erfaring. Siste innlegg på bloggen hans heter Successful Combat Operations. Et sita fra kommentarfeltet:
I must however caution you that Africa is not Afghanistan and therefore Afghan mentoring experience is not necessarily construed as “good experience” by us as we approach matters very differently.
STTEP International leverer ikke mindre enn "...provides a wide field of assistance and support to under-siege governments". På LinkedIn står han som styreformann i selskapet, og han oppsummerer seg selv slik:
I saw active service in conventional, clandestine and covert units of the South African Defence Force.
I was the founder of the Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes in 1989 and its chairman until I left in 1997. Until its closure in 1998, EO operated primarily in Africa helping African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. EO also operated in South America and the Far East. I believe that only Africans (Black and White) can truly solve Africa’s problems.
I was appointed Chairman of STTEP International Ltd in 2009. STTEP provides a wide field of assistance and support to under-siege governments. I also lecture at military colleges and universities in Africa on political, defence, intelligence and security issues.
Prior to the STTEP International appointment, I served as an independent politico-military advisor to several African governments.
I provide assistance to companies and corporations on strategy development, strategic guidance, strategic leadership, hostile market penetration, attacking and defending markets, business intelligence and counter intelligence, security awareness training, business and marketing warfare and so forth.
I provide this assistance and support in my “down-time” and in my private capacity.
I am a Contributing Editor to The Counter Terrorist magazine.
I believe that failure is never an option.
Grei garanti STTEP gir: STTEP guarantees success and has never failed in a mission. Failure is never an option.
Åpenbart en gruppe og en mann vi kommer til å høre mer om i fremtiden.
Eeben Barlow har vaert aktiv siden SAP gjennom SADF sitt BRP program paa 1970 tallet. Det er en del sukkseshistorer som ikke har sett dagens lys som kommer fra miljoet rundt han. Han bruker pressen nar det gagner objektivene hans. Han er en dyktik strategigikker. At vestens innsatts med Trenere, Mentorerer som selv ikke skal delta i og ta ned fienden, og ikke utsettes for fare er en model som har lite eller ingen effekt er ikke noe nytt. Her kan vi nevne NOrges symbolske bidrag til Irak, effekten av slike oppdrag er null paa bakken.
Gjennom bruk av pressen sier Eben at han kan faa jobben gjort, og tenker at det muligens er flere i Afrika som hvil bruke hans model. Tidligere 44 Para, 32BN, SWA Recce, brukte samme COIN taktik med konstant angrep hvor flere skift avloser hverandre og presser fienden i form av konstant angrep, sabotasje, luftangrep, BK angrep, attentater av hovedpersoner etc. Saa er det opp til de lokale og sikre bakken naar Fienden beveger seg - i denne fasen nar fienden beveger seg, intensifiseres angrepene siden en har stor mulighet til og oppnaa store tapstall hos fienden og odlegge alt de prover og ta med seg. Ved en slik COIN strategi er det priofriterte maal som konstant angripes og prioritetene skiftes etter som situvasjon forandrer seg og her er Eben god paa og analysere og ligge litt foran fienden.
The Little-Known $15 Billion Empire Of Africa's Richest Man
Aliko Dangote lives as you might expect, given he’s the richest person in Africa and resides in the same country being bullied by the insidious Boko Haram terrorist group, which finds something noble in kidnapping village girls.
Last August, as the Islamic State overran northern Iraq and Boko Haram was declaring its own caliphate in Nigeria, the White House held a U.S.-Africa trade summit in Washington, D.C. A highlight was the announcement of a $5 billion fund backed by Wall Street billionaire Steve Schwarzman’s Blackstone Group–and Dangote. They plan to invest in infrastructure companies throughout sub-Saharan Africa. “We can do well as investors, and the countries will do well,” Schwarzman says. “We’re aware that operating in Africa isn’t as easy as many other places. You have to have a very strong local partner, and we were lucky enough to find Aliko. He’s done a remarkable job.”
Nigeria consistently ranks in the bottom quarter of the most corrupt countries in the world, according to Transparency International, and is proving a feckless pursuer of the Boko Haram thugs terrorizing the northeast.
Boko Haram militants attacked two villages in southern Niger's Diffa region overnight, killing at least 30 civilians, two security sources said on Thursday. Its government has declared a state of emergency for the region and has arrested more than 600 people it accuses of links to the group.
The most likely outcome would be an increased flow of weapons from North Africa through the region’s porous borders toward Nigeria. There is also potential for the exchange of foreign fighters (though to date there is very little evidence of foreigners from outside the region fighting with Boko Haram). Boko Haram is already demonstrating increased capacity to wage its war inside Nigeria—a continuing expansion of the fight to West Africa’s capitals is likely to be next.
BOKO HARAM AND ESCALATING REGIONAL TERROR
• A multinational joint task force consisting of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger has driven Boko Haram from key territorial strongholds in northeastern Nigeria; on June 18, the Chadian military conducted airstrikes against six Boko Haram bases in Nigeria
• But the terror group continues to launch deadly, near-daily attacks throughout the region—including on June 15 with twin suicide bombings in Chad—using guerrilla tactics rather than conventional warfare
• Nigeria’s newly-inaugurated president, Muhammadu Buhari, has moved quickly to support regional counter-Boko Haram efforts, insisting on Nigerian leadership in the task force and pledging $100 million in financial support
• Despite the nascent successes of the joint task force, Islamic State gains in North Africa and, in particular, Libya, could impact the flow of weapons and fighters into Nigeria; Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March of this year.
In response to the increasingly regional threat posed by the terror group Boko Haram, the government of Nigeria has increased its cooperation with neighbors Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. In January, the four countries revisited the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—originally formed in 1998 to address security concerns in the Lake Chad area—to combat the group’s spread beyond Nigeria’s borders. In a separate but equally momentous bilateral agreement, Nigeria agreed to allow Chadian troops to enter Nigerian territory to fight Boko Haram.
Challenges to the partnership quickly emerged: Nigeria was initially reluctant to cede sovereignty to its fellow task force partners, an issue made worse by historic territorial disputes with Chad and Cameroon; its military faced record-low morale as soldiers refused to fight against Boko Haram due to lack of ammunition and basic supplies; and Nigerian leadership of the coalition was derailed by an election delay and a lame-duck president. In the early weeks of the intervention, President Idriss Déby of Chad complained that his forces were defeating Boko Haram and retaking towns in northern Nigeria, only to be delayed by the Nigerian military, which was supposed to deploy to protect the task force’s gains.
Despite its limitations, the MNJTF has thus far managed some successes against Boko Haram. In February and March, the armies of the MNJTF reclaimed 36 towns across three states. Forces from Chad and Niger were instrumental in expelling Boko Haram from the key towns of Malam Fatouri and Damasak, killing 300 fighters in the process. In March, the Nigerian government announced that only three local government areas were still being held by Boko Haram.
In the few weeks since his inauguration, President Buhari has worked hard to cement these gains. He recently moved Nigerian military headquarters from the country’s capital Abuja to the northeastern town of Maiduguri—which has been targeted time and again by Boko Haram—in effort to streamline decision-making and move it closer to the front lines. He has pledged $100 million in support to the MNJTF, $21 million of which has already been disbursed. On Monday, the U.S. pledged an additional $5 million to the task force. At an anti-Boko Haram summit in Abuja this month, Buhari convinced MNJTF partners to accept a Nigerian commander, rather than rotating leadership, as previously suggested. Cooperation seems to be improving, and neighboring Benin has plans to join the coalition as well.
The turnaround has nevertheless been short-lived. In recent weeks, it has become clear the government’s territorial gains were overstated, and Boko Haram has decidedly retaken the initiative. The terror group’s ties to the so-called Islamic State appear to be paying off in strengthened tactical capacity: head-on battles over territory have given way to ambushes and phased, multi-pronged attacks. Possession of northern towns has continued to seesaw between pro-government and rebel forces. Boko Haram has responded to the announced relocation of army headquarters by launching multiple raids on the city, killing dozens of soldiers and civilians. And on June 15, two suicide bombings in Chad’s capital N’Djamena killed 34 people and injured more than 100. Assuming that Boko Haram is behind these latest attacks, it would mark the first time it has successfully struck the Chadian capital. Nations involved with the MNJTF should expect Boko Haram to continue to attack soft targets in their countries, particularly as the group is pushed out of its strongholds inside Nigeria.
Neither Chad nor Cameroon have the capacity to sustain an open-ended conflict with Boko Haram, and public opinion of the military engagement may sour if the countries find themselves victimized by escalating terror attacks.
A scenario of escalating regional terror attacks indeed seems most likely. Boko Haram allied officially with the Islamic State in March, declaring itself the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP). As the Islamic State grows its presence in Libya (Libyan fighters associated with the Islamic State seized the coastal city of Sirte earlier this month), its partnership with Boko Haram could become more substantive. The most likely outcome would be an increased flow of weapons from North Africa through the region’s porous borders toward Nigeria. There is also potential for the exchange of foreign fighters (though to date there is very little evidence of foreigners from outside the region fighting with Boko Haram). Boko Haram is already demonstrating increased capacity to wage its war inside Nigeria—a continuing expansion of the fight to West Africa’s capitals is likely to be next.
Den nigerianske ekstremistgruppen Boko Haram har gjennomført nye massakrer nordøst i Nigeria, ifølge lokaler kilder. Nær 200 mennesker har blitt drept på to døgn.
Sv: Boko Haram - Nigeriansk Islamistisk militant gruppe
Cameroon’s army, backed by a regional taskforce, has killed at least 100 members of the militant Islamist Boko Haram group and freed 900 people it had held hostage, the west African country’s defence ministry has said.
Sv: Boko Haram - Nigeriansk Islamistisk militant gruppe
Troops fighting Boko Haram terrorists in the North East have killed 29 terrorists in several clearance operations, while 72 innocent citizens taken hostage, including women and children, were rescued.
IS og Boko Haram har funnet sammen. Det er interessant ift at de nok kan forsterke hverandre, men også fordi de kan utnytte det propagandamessig. Ser vi på kartet er det interessante utfordringer i forhold til store deler av Nord-Afrika får de koordinert seg litt. Det er også store inntektsmuligheter.
På et eller annet tidspunkt må resten av verden evne å koordinere slagkraftig og reell samfunnsbyggende innsats.
Sv: Boko Haram - Nigeriansk Islamistisk militant gruppe
Opprinnelig skrevet av Dagbladet
FNs sikkerhetsråd ber nå Boko Haram om å umiddelbart stoppe volden, overgrepene og bruddene på menneskerettighetene i Lake Chad Basin-regionen, hvor de er alvorlig bekymret over situasjonen. http://www.dagbladet.no/2016/05/14/n...aram/44231152/
Sv: Boko Haram - Nigeriansk Islamistisk militant gruppe
Jepp, det er et bra tiltak å be Boko Haram om å oppføre seg som folk. Dette blir sikkert tatt til følge. Noen ganger må det kunne gå an å si rett ut at enten oppfører man seg, ellers vil døden komme... (forutsatt at man da har evne og vilje til å følge opp slike trusler).
Sv: Boko Haram - Nigeriansk Islamistisk militant gruppe
En kan jo true med å sette ned en multinasjonal arbeidsgruppe som kan formulere en spisset bekymring, vel viten at en ikke kan bruke for sterke ord for da vil det bare bli stoppet i veto av de to medlemmene i sikkerhetsrådet som har en litt alternative tilnærming til folkerett og demokrati....
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